LEGITIMACY OF LAW AS A SPECIAL PROCESS OF RECOGNITION OF ITS JUSTICE BY CIVIL SOCIETY

Abstract

The article examines the theoretical aspects of the legitimacy of law as a special process of recognition by civil society of the Justice of legal norms. It is determined that traditionally the legitimacy of a law is considered as its recognition (general recognition), approval (of individual norms, the rule of law in general), which implies the consent of subjects to comply with the rules established in a certain regulatory system. It is stated that the legitimacy of a right is the result of its legitimation, the process (procedure) of recognizing the validity (validity) of a right according to certain criteria, and therefore it’s generally recognized legal force. It is argued that in current legal practice, the problem of legal legitimacy arises in relation to individual norms and institutions, legislative innovations. Only in extreme cases, when the social order as a whole is under threat of destruction, can we talk about the legitimacy of the entire relevant regulatory system. It is proved that members of civil society participate in the dialogue between the legislator and his addressees. As the addressees of a parliamentary legislator, subjects of civil society test his relations with "ordinary" citizens, with the executive and judicial authorities. It is noted that the activities of such entities are not always institutionalized, especially not always showing their "non-system Nature". It is comparable to the" public sphere", which acts in the process of legitimizing law as a mediator between individuals and official authorities. However, in this concept, the consensus achieved in the "public sphere" legitimizes legal innovation, if as a result of rational discourse, each participant turns from the addressee of the norm into its author. Due to the absence of recipients, a dialogue with them is also excluded. It is argued that in the course of legitimization of law, the requirements for stability and certainty of the rule of law and its dynamic development, stimulated by the addressees of legal prescriptions, inevitably collide. A kind of legitimation paradox is revealed: the constant reproduction of legality (individual norms, institutions) requires the legislator, on the one hand, to maintain the official status of the norm, and on the other – to pay attention to its content, which satisfies the addressees of the norm, which corresponds to their ideas about "just law". Attention is focused on the fact that today it is the policy of law that could synthesize the principles of positivity and naturalness of law, based on the necessity of its "correctness" and justice inherent in the nature of law. It is noted that as an "adviser" (not a servant) of the legislator, the policy of law would promote his dialogue with the addressees about the urgent problems of the development of law, about the need to prepare such innovative legal transformations that would receive a legitimate sanction – "fair law".