CYBERFORCES OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE: SCIENTIFIC AND PRACTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DRAFT LAW OF UKRAINE “ON CYBERFORCES OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE” IN COMPARISON WITH NATO MODELS

Abstract

The article offers a comprehensive analysis of the Draft Law of Ukraine “On the Cyber Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” which envisages the establishment of a distinct military component tasked with conducting operations in cyberspace and across the electromagnetic spectrum. The study aims to assess the legal foundations, institutional design, and anticipated powers of the Cyber Forces, as well as the implications of the proposed norms for human rights and their alignment with NATO approaches. Methodologically, it combines doctrinal legal analysis with an institutional comparison against the NATO Cyberspace Operations Centre (CyOC) at SHAPE, the NATO Integrated Cyber Defence Centre (NICC), the AJP-3.20 doctrine, and a review of the capability frameworks of the NCI Agency/NCSC alongside the training-and-research ecosystem of the CCDCOE.The findings indicate that the draft law accords with the broader trend toward the institutionalisation of cyber defence and creates preconditions for operational interoperability with NATO–inter alia through centralised command, an emphasis on cyber deterrence, and the possibility of contracting civilian experts (a cyber reserve). At the same time, the analysis identifies risks of mandate duplication with the Armed Forces’ existing Signal and Cyber Security Troops, insufficient specification of inter-agency coordination (involving the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine – SSSCIP/CERT-UA, the Security Service of Ukraine – SBU, the National Police of Ukraine – NPU, and the National Cybersecurity Coordination Center – NCCC at the NSDC), and gaps in procedural safeguards for human rights (privacy and data protection, proportionality of technical measures, and judicial as well as parliamentary oversight).The article proposes amendments to core defence statutes to delineate competences clearly; the adoption of standard operating procedures (SOPs) and protocols for data-sharing and joint operations; the implementation of risk-based approaches and internal compliance audits; and the institutional embedding of interfaces with CyOC/NICC, NCI Agency programmes, and participation in “Locked Shields” exercises.The practical significance lies in outlining a roadmap for the second reading that reconciles national-security requirements with human-rights guarantees while enhancing the resilience and governance of cyber defence.The scholarly contribution consists in synthesising legal, institutional, and capability dimensions within a comparative Ukraine–NATO perspective.