VALUABLE CONCEPTS IN THE PRACTICE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF UKRAINE: LEGAL CERTAINTY, DISCRETION AND CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES

Abstract

The article provides a comprehensive analysis of the approaches adopted by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine to the interpretation and application of evaluative concepts in the context of the principle of legal certainty and the limits of judicial discretion. Particular attention is paid to the role of evaluative concepts in criminal procedure, where procedural decisions directly affect the restriction of fundamental human rights and freedoms. The study substantiates that the extensive use of evaluative terminology in criminal procedural legislation and judicial practice entails increased risks of legal uncertainty and arbitrary law enforcement, thereby reinforcing the stabilizing function of constitutional adjudication. The paper traces the evolution of the legal positions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, from perceiving evaluative concepts as deficiencies of legislative drafting to recognizing them as a potentially legitimate instrument of individualized law enforcement, provided that clear normative and interpretative boundaries exist. Key decisions of the Court are analyzed in which the criteria for the admissibility of evaluative concepts in cases involving restrictions of human rights and freedoms have been formulated, as well as approaches to controlling discretionary powers of public authorities. It is argued that the admissibility of evaluative concepts in criminal procedure is determined not by the degree of abstraction of a legal norm, but by its capacity to ensure the foreseeability of legal consequences, prevent arbitrary interference with human rights, and maintain a balance between the necessary flexibility of legal regulation and the requirements of the rule of law. The article concludes that the practice of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine establishes a system of constitutional guidelines that confine evaluative judgment within the framework of legal certainty, proportionality, and institutional guarantees of judicial independence