PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION INSTRUMENTS IN THE CONDITIONS OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR

Abstract

The article provides a scholarly analysis of the philosophical and legal foundations of the instruments of public administration in the context of the Russian–Ukrainian war, viewed through a dynamic understanding of law as a social phenomenon. It demonstrates the evolution of conceptions of law enforcement from a formalistic application of administrative law norms toward an argument-based choice among alternatives that takes the social context into account. It substantiates that, under such conditions, the importance of interpretation, reasoning, and assessment of the consequences of administrative decisions increases. The transformation of public administration instruments from formally normative to context-oriented forms of influence is highlighted. Emphasis is placed on the necessity of preserving the legal limits of interference as a condition for the legitimacy of decisions during wartime. It is determined that, in wartime conditions, public administration instruments acquire a functional character aimed at ensuring state resilience and protecting fundamental public values. The role of wartime normative legal acts, special administrative regimes, and accelerated decision-making procedures is analyzed as the basis for legal responses to threats. It is proven that their application cannot be reduced to the automatic execution of prescriptions without assessing real circumstances and requires integration with forecasting, planning, and control. The combination of classical and innovative instruments in the fields of defense and security is outlined, in particular through digitalization, decentralization, and network-based coordination. It is systematized that public administration instruments during the wartime period cannot be value-neutral, as they are directly linked to the legitimacy, proportionality, and public perception of administrative decisions. The application of the criterion of strict necessity and the requirement of proportionality of restrictions on rights and freedoms is substantiated as a philosophical and legal foundation of administrative interventions. An increased role of public justification of actions by administrative bodies is established as an element of decision legitimation. The institutional responsibility of administrative bodies for the consequences of applying public administration instruments is revealed, along with the need to adjust decisions through mechanisms of control, supervision, and appeal procedures