LEGAL CERTAINTY AS A CRITERION FOR THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION

Abstract

This article investigates a fundamental problem of modern jurisprudence: defining the limits of judicial interpretation within the context of ensuring the principle of legal certainty as an integral component of the rule of law. Based on an analysis of legal doctrine, the article attempts to reveal the dialectical contradiction between the requirement for stability in legal regulation and the ability of the application of law to adapt to the dynamics of social relations. It substantiates the thesis that judicial interpretation is not merely a technical stage of applying the law, but a condition for realizing the right to justice, particularly in situations of normative ambiguity and the existence of legal gaps. The study explores the evolutionary shift in the role of the court as an active entity that not only applies the law but also, to a certain extent, is capable of shaping the law itself, subtly supplementing its content through judicial interpretation. At the same time, it notes the necessity of developing clear criteria capable of reasonably limiting discretion and potential excessive judicial activism, preventing interpretation from transforming into illegitimate law-making. Special attention is devoted to analyzing the requirement for consistency in judicial